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CASE NOTES
In Lincoln Mills,40 which involved labor legislation, 41 the Supreme Court
said:
[the lack of express statutory sanction . . . will be solved by look-
ing at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will
effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be
determined by the nature of the problem. . • [For] it is not uncom-
mon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are
concerned. 42
Futhermore, in actions based on other federal statutes, federal courts, inter-
preting congressional intent, have created federal rules in furtherance of the
intendment of the particular act."
Further support for the creation of a "federal common law," if Massa-
chusetts law is inapplicable, is found analogously in I. I. Case Co. v. Barak."
There, the state law was silent on any available relief to the plaintiff, a
shareholder suing to void a merger obtained by misrepresentation in proxies
in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 45 Similarly, in the in-
stant case, Massachusetts courts are silent on whether a large number of
shareholders is an excuse. In Borak, the Supreme Court said:
[I] t is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies
as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose. .
[W] e believe that the overriding federal law applicable here would,
where the facts required, control the appropriateness of redress de-
spite the provisions of state corporation law.	 . . Moreover, if
federal jurisdiction were limited . . . the hurdles that the victim
might face . . . might well prove insuperable to effective relief."
Thus, if the Massachusetts law were as stringent as the district court thought,
its application in the instant case would inhibit the purposes of the act. In
that event, the First Circuit intimates, the scope of federal common law
should include federally created rules of decision governing legitimate ex-
cuses from making demand upon shareholders as a condition precedent to
bringing a derivative action under the Investment Company Act.
JOHN M. MORAN
Estate Taxation—Nature of Insurance Proceeds Includible in Decedent's
Gross Estate.—In re Noel.'—This action was brought to review a finding
made by the Commissioner that proceeds paid under a flight insurance policy
40 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 38.
41 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
42 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 38, at 457.
43 Rogers v. American Can Co., supra note 22; McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292
F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961); Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. International Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 198 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 1961). See Notes, cited supra note 37.
44 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
45 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1958).
46 Supra note 44, at 433-35.
1 332 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1964).
619
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
were to be taxed as part of the decedent's gross estate. The decedent was
issued two flight insurance policies prior to his departure for Venezuela, each
valued at $62,500. The decedent's wife paid the premiums and was designated
the beneficiary. The plane crashed, killing the decedent, and his wife recovered
the full amount of the policies. The petitioners, executors of the decedent's
estate, filed the required estate tax return after the decedent's death, but did
not include the amount paid under the insurance policies in the assets of the
gross estate. The Commissioner determined a deficiency in the tax paid, basing
this ruling on Section 2042(2) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. 2 The Tax
Court upheld the Commissioner's determination ; 8
 and on appeal the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit HELD: The benefits received
on the death of the insured from an accident insurance policy, as opposed to a
life insurance policy, are not to be included in the gross estate of the decedent
under section 2042(2).
In interpreting section 2042(2), the court first considered the ordinary
and accepted meaning of "insurance . . . on the life of the decedent." The
court asserted that these words comtemplate a form of insurance, the nature of
which is to insure against the death of the insured. Since the contingency or
risk insured against determines the nature of an insurance policy, a policy
primarily insuring against a contingency other than death is not insurance on
life. In the case of life insurance, the inevitable death of the insured is the
contingency insured against. Accident insurance, however, indemnifies the
insured against the risk of accident. The mere fact that death may result from
the accident does not change the "essential nature" of the policy to give it the
character of insurance on life.
The second major element in the court's reasoning is that Congress
intended the predecessors of section 2042(2), as well as section 2042(2)
itself, to apply exclusively to life insurance. Prior to 1918, a common method
of avoiding the estate tax on the transfer of life insurance proceeds at the
insured's death was to make them payable to a beneficiary rather than the
executor of the estate. In this way the face amount of the policy passed
outside of the estate and was therefore not subject to an estate tax. Section
402(f) of the Revenue Act of 19185
 foreclosed this possibility of circumvent-
ing the estate tax for the first time by making all proceeds of insurance on life,
whether payable to a beneficiary or the executor, includible in the decedent's
gross estate!' This reason also underlies the passage of successors to section
402(f), the most recent of which is Section 2042(2) of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code. The conclusion that Congress intended these sections to apply
to Life insurance is drawn from the fact that only life insurance could be used
effectively as a method of avoiding estate taxation in this way. This scheme
can be operative in planning an estate only when the insurance provides the
policyholder with investment features and an inevitable payment of the face
value of the policy. Life insurance is shown by the court to have such
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042(2).
8 Estate of Noel, 39 T.C. 466 (1962).
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042(2).
5 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1098.
8 See H.R, Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918).
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characteristics. On the other hand, because accident insurance has no
investment features and insures against an event which may never occur, it
cannot be used as a projected plan to avoid estate taxation at the death of the
insured. Therefore, the court concluded, accident insurance cannot be included
within the purpose of the statutes.
Each of the two major arguments of the court has an inherent weakness
which renders it of questionable support for a decision which breaks with
strong precedent. Regarding the first premise outlined above, although the
occurrence of the accident is one necessary factor in making the insurance
company liable, the accident must be coupled with injurious consequences
before the company will actually become obligated to make payment. It is,
therefore, the consequence of the accident, rather than the accident itself,
which is the contingency that triggers payment of the proceeds. If in this case
the plane had crashed but Noel had escaped injury, there would have been no
payment of proceeds. The accident, however, did result in death, and it was
actually the death of Noel which triggered the payment of the insurance
money. The terms of the policy taken out by Noel provided for specified
amounts to be paid for certain kinds of injury, but it was stipulated that the
principal sum of the policy was only to be paid in the event of death. There-
fore, since death is, in reality, a contingency insured against, the accident
policy is, among other things, insurance on life. Clearly, to include this type
of accident insurance within the statutory phrase, "insurance . . . on the life
of the decedent," comports with the "ordinary, plain and generally accepted
meaning"7 of the words.
Secondly, the conclusion drawn by the court that Congress intended
section 2042(2) to include only life insurance overlooks the context and
repeated usage of the words "insurance . . . on ... life." 8 The fact that this
identical phrase is used in both subsection (1) and subsection (2) of the
section indicates that Congress intended the meaning of the phrase to remain
consistent throughout the section. The Congressional history of the section
indicates that "insurance ... on .. . life" in subsection (1) was intended
to encompass death benefits from accident insurance as well as proceeds from
life insurance. In the report of the Ways and Means Committee cited by the
courts the phrase, "insurance . . . on . . . life," used in subsection (1) was
said to fall within the scheme of Section 202 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1916. 10
This was the test applied by the court. In re Noel, supra note 1, at 952.
s Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042 provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property—
(1) Receivable by the executor.—To the extent of the amount receivable
by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries—To the extent of the amount re-
ceivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of
the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any
of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with
any other person. . . (Emphasis added.)
9
 H.R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918). The Ways and Means Com-
mittee Report actually explained § 402(f) of the Revenue Act of 1918, but since reasons
underlying both § 402(f) of that Act and § 2042(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 are the same it refers equally to § 2042(2). See In re Noel, supra note 1, at 954.
10 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(a), 39 Stat. 777.
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Section 202(a) provided that all "real, personal, tangible or intangible"
property which is owned by a decedent at his death is to be subject to an
estate tax. Because accident insurance is intangible personal property and is
capable of ownership by a decedent at his death," as was the case in Noel,
it is within the scheme of section 202(a). Since subsection (1) of section
2042 is only a more specific re-enactment of section 202(a), 12 it must also
include accident insurance within its meaning. The conclusion then follows
that if the phrase, "insurance . . on . . . life," includes accident insurance
in subsection (1), the identical phrase must be given the same meaning in
subsection (2) of section 2042. This result is not inconsistent with the portion
of the Committee report concerning tax avoidance, because, although Congress
showed an intent to include life insurance for particular reasons, it never
indicated that it intended to exclude other forms of insurance. 13
There is a further aspect, which was not considered by the court. If the
court's reasoning is followed to its logical extremity, the proceeds of a term
insurance policy would have to be excluded from estate taxation. Term
insurance resembles accident insurance more than it resembles ordinary life
insurance as these forms of insurance are defined by the court, for term in-
surance has no investment features and does not subject the insurance
company to an absolute risk of payment of the value of the policy. Term .
insurance, therefore, would not be used as a tax avoidance device and does not
fall within the court's understanding of the purpose of section 2042(2). If, in
order to include term insurance, the court were to differentiate term insurance
from accident insurance on the grounds that term insurance falls more easily
within the words "insurance . . . on .. . life," a strong argument could be
made that the flight insurance policy taken out by Noel was actually a term
policy. The flight policy comes within the definition of a term policy because
it insures the insured's life for a fixed term (the time the plane is in the air).
Furthermore, a life policy was said by the court to insure against death from
any cause, unless the cause is excepted in the terms of the policy." It could
be argued that the flight policy insures the decedent against death from any
cause, except death from natural causes and death resulting from disease. 15
In holding as it does, the court in the instant case comes into conflict
with well-reasoned precedent. The leading case, Leopold Ackerman v. Corn-
11 Insurance contracts are generally held to be personal property or choses in
action. 12 Appleman, Insurance Law Sr Practice § 7007 (1943).
12 H.R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918) stated that the construction
of § 202(a) of the Revenue Act of 1916 was written into this subsequent section, "for
the sake of clearness."
13 It is interesting to note that in the Ways and Means Committee Report the word
"life" neither appears alone nor in conjunction with insurance. The Committee spoke
only of insurance, never using the terms "insurance . . on . . . life." It can be pre-
sumed that "on life" was used in the statute to differentiate other forms of insurance,
i.e., home insurance, automobile insurance, etc., from insurance which is payable because
of the death of the insured.
14 In re Noel, supra note 1, at 952.
15 These exceptions are not as all-encompassing as they might otherwise be, because
in the course of a flight, if death is to occur at all, the great likelihood is that it will be
by accident.
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missioner," decided that proceeds received from the double indemnity clause
of an insurance contract should be taxed as part of the decedent's gross
estate. In arriving at this determination, the court asserted that Congress
must have intended both accident and life insurance to be grouped within the
meaning of Section 302(g) of the 1924 Revenue Act," the predecessor of
section 2042. The Ackerman court noted that Congress expressly distinguished
between life and casualty insurance in section 503 of the Revenue Act of 1918,
and merely used the words "insurance . .. on . . . life" in section 402(f)
of that act. 18 The conclusion thus followed that Congress must have intended
to separate the two in the former and group the two together in the latter
section."
The weight of precedent is clearly on the side of assessment of estate
taxes where insurance contracts have insured against avoidable events and
involved no investment features. For example, the proceeds of war risk in-
surance, where the policy is effective for only a limited amount of time
and minimum premiums are paid, have been held subject to an estate tax
by way of Section 811(g) of the Revenue Act of 1939, 20 a predecessor of
section 2042(2 ) . 21 The courts have so held 22 even in the light of federal
legislation making the proceeds of these policies exempt from estate taxa-
tion.23
 The effect of this legislation was circumvented by deeming the pro-
ceeds themselves exempt from the tax, while levying the tax on the privilege
of transferring the benefits. In still another case,24 death benefits, payable
as a result of a fund set up by the New York Stock Exchange, were held
taxable under section 2042. Members of the Exchange contributed fifteen
dollars upon admittance to the Exchange and fifteen dollars upon the death
of any member. This "gratuity fund" thereby entitled the widows of the
deceased member to receive $20,000, or something less if that amount could
not be collected. In deciding that these benefits were to be taxed as insurance
on life, Judge Learned Hand provided an interesting interpretation of section
811 (g) :
The respondent's argument, as I understand it, is that in the tax
statute [811 (g)], the word should be limited to conventional life
insurance, based upon adequate actuarial bases, and perhaps limited
by the exclusion of bad risks. That appears to me [much] too cir-
cumscribed a reading of the phrase: "Insurance of every descrip-
tion." Back of the statute lies the purpose, I think, to include in a
19 15 B.T.A. 635 (1929).
17 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 302(g), 43 Stat. 305.
18
 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 503, 40 Stat. 1104.
19 This reasoning was held significant with regard to the Revenue Act of 1924,
since § 302(g) of that Act is a re-enactment of § 402(f) of the Revenue Act of 1918.
The wording of § 2042(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is substantially the
same as that of both § 402(f) of the Revenue Act of 1918 and § 302(g) of the Revenue
Act of 1924.
20 Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(g), 53 Stat. 122. This section in part provided
that the gross estate included proceeds "under policies upon the life of the decedent."
21 United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1938).
20 United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Helvering, 307 U.S. 57 (1939).
23 World War Veterans Act of 1924, ch. 320, § 22, 43 Stat. 613.
24 Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1950).
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man's estate whatever provision he may have made for his suc-
cessors, which depends upon his death, and which he has secured
by means of "premiums" or "other considerations," paid during his
life.25
This weight of precedent in opposition to the court's holding takes on a
particular importance in view of the fact that the section of the Code dealing
with estate taxation of insurance has been re-enacted many times, and Con-
gress obviously saw no need to change or clarify the meaning given to this
section by court holdings. Apparently, some stamp of approval was given by
Congress to the interpretation which the courts and regulations had given
this section. Repeated re-enactment of a statute, in the light of judicial and
administrative interpretation of that statute, usually gives the interpretation
the force of law."
Another important aspect of Noel, which warrants consideration, is the
possible repercussions which might arise as a result of its holding. Proceeds
from an insurance policy were exempted from income taxation by Section
101(a) of the Code." The rationale for this exemption is that it would be
unfair to subject insurance proceeds to an income tax, since they are already
subject to estate taxation. 28 Because Noel has made the determination that
proceeds from certain types of insurance policies are to be excluded from
a decedent's gross estate and therefore are to be immune from estate taxation,
the reason for excluding these proceeds from income taxation no longer
exists. The result of Noel, therefore, is either to create a tax "loophole,"
whereby these proceeds would pass with no tax being assessed on the transfer,
or to subject accident and possibly forms of term insurance proceeds to
income taxation.
The court, in the instant case, is on questionable ground in excluding
death benefits of accident insurance from estate taxation. In the absence
of a meaningful argument to the contrary, death benefits resulting from
many forms of insurance fall within the clear and ordinary meaning of the
words "insurance . . . on . . . life." Also, a long standing determination of an
issue should not be overruled without meeting head-on the decisions of
precedent cases in the area and without consideration of the serious reper-
cussions which are likely to arise as a result of such reversal."
MARK L. COHEN
Labor Law—Section 504 LMRDA—Communist Labor Officials—Con-
stitutionality.—Brown v. United States.'—The defendant, Archie Brown,
had been a member of the Communist Party since at least 1935. From 1959
215 Id. at 293. The words "insurance of every description" used by Learned Hand
were taken from the regulation which is found in Treas. Reg. 20.2042-1.
26 United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Commissioner, supra note 21, at 735.
27 Int. Rev, Code of 1954, § 101(a).
28
 1 Bowe, Estate Planning & Taxation 437 (1957).
29 Certiorari has been granted. Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, appeal docketed,
No. 503, 2d Cir., June 17, 1964; cert. granted, 33 U.S.L. Week 3208 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1964).
1 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 33 U.S.L. Week 3169 (U.S. Nov.
9, 1964) (No. 399).
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